Santa Cruz’s Good Times weekly has purchased the Press-Banner from Tank Town Media just as the Santa Cruz Mountains newspaper prepares to celebrate its 60th year of publishing.

Santa Cruz became the second city in the nation to add a city sanctioned Black Lives Matter mural in front of City Hall on September 12th. The effort began in early June, when local artist was Abi Mustapha connected with City Arts Commission Vice Chair Sean McGowen.  After many months of paperwork, planning, presenting, and fundraising, more than 500 community members helped paint the mural throughout the day. 

This week’s focus is on the Ben Lomond Fire Protection District (BLFD) personnel, led by Fire Chief Stacie Brownlee and Assistant Chief Mike Ayers, who was interviewed for this article. Chief Ayers has been in the fire service for 39 years. He started with CalFire (formerly the California Department of Forestry) in 198, and was a volunteer with Zayante. In 1986, after moving to Ben Lomond, Ayers joined the Tiburon Fire Protection District, and worked there for 31 years. After retiring as a Battalion Chief with Tiburon, Ayers became a Board member with BLFD, and eventually gave up that seat in order to join the department in a chief officer role. Ayers also runs training and operations for the district. From Fire Chief Brownlee on down, there are a total of 28 personnel to serve the district, plus another five volunteers eagerly waiting to join the department. Chief Ayers said that those personnel, plus additional townspeople who came out to assist, were pivotal in the success of holding the CZU fire back from town. “At one point, we had 55 people here. We have a lot of guys who live here that are career firefighters elsewhere, and they all came back to help. Retirees (like former Fire Chief Steve Sanders, former Captain Eddie Butler, Robert Sanchez and Jack Muncie) came in, picked up phones and helped administratively,” said Ayers. “The Brumbaugh family came in to cook and take care of laundry for everyone, and ran our resource board. It was definitely a community effort.” Press Banner: I learned a lot about resource management from interviewing Boulder Creek Fire Chief Mark Bingham. Did Ben Lomond Fire run their response the same way? Chief Ayers: I’d say it was pretty similar. We rotated people through on 24-hour shifts the first three days. After that, we rotated companies through on 12-hour shifts to allow everyone to get some sleep. The maximum personnel we had out on the line at one time were five engines, one utility vehicle, two chief’s vehicles—so 24 people total. Chief officers mainly stayed out on the fire line, and caught sleep when we could. PB: Were you deployed in support of CalFire, or was CalFire deployed to support your department? CA: Our deployment began late on Saturday, August 15th with calls for trees and power lines down due to the lightning storm. I don’t think any of us were thinking we would get fire starts out of it; I’ve seen lightning storms come through before, and we get a tiny fire that burns itself out, but by Sunday, we had an engine assigned to the 3-11 Fire. As soon as you hear that, you know that CalFire is assigning numbers because it’s a complex fire—the number three is CalFire’s number for the Zayante area, and the number 11 means there are at least 11 active fires. The engine company stayed out on Sunday and Monday, and halfway thru our Tuesday night drill (on August 18th), we were dispatched as a strike team for structure protection to Boulder Creek. Two engines wound up there, and they were there for two days. All the chief officers for Boulder Creek were tied up, so I was running coverage for both districts, and then I acquired a task force of Boulder Creek resources for managing spot fires and other incidents. Our engines, along with Dalton Warren from Zayante Fire, were assigned structure protection duties under Boulder Creek Captain Gabe Vega. The weird thing about this fire is how personal it was. I’ve responded to other big fires around the region, and when you’re deployed, it’s all business. You do your job and return home. Here, the fire was in our home town, so when you’re responding to a spot fire, it may be at the home of someone you know. It’s a totally different experience. There was a big emotional investment in this incident, because many of us knew people—including firefighters—who were affected by it. The parents of one of our firefighters lost their home, but our firefighters were all spared. At one point, we were up on Braemoor Drive, assessing when the fire was going to impact Ben Lomond. We arrived right after the engines had pulled out, and saw the home of another one of our firefighter’s parents. The deck was burning, so we pulled out some chainsaws and went to work doing structure protection. CalFire ended up cutting a bulldozer line behind the home to stop the fire’s advancement, and the home was saved as a result. PB: It sounds like a fire of this magnitude creates a real need for responding agencies to have great communication and teamwork with each other. How do you remain focused on what you need to do and not get distracted with all the other chatter? CA: On the 19th, our Ben Lomond team met with Shawn Norman, the CalFire Operations Deputy Chief. From Wednesday, August 19th thru Thursday, August 20th, the fire grew 43,000 acres. We discussed the impact of the fire. We already knew about the limited resources available via CalFire; my five top responders are seasonal firefighters with CalFire, and they were all serving under that agency. Several complex fires had all broken at the same time, so we were competing with other large incidents for resources. Norman and I spoke about what had happened with the Camp Fire in Paradise, so we had a contingency for Ben Lomond proper. Our idea was to get up the mountain and stop the fire there in order to protect the Highway 9 corridor. We always had one engine here on patrol, because the fire spotted pretty far out. We had pieces of singed redwood bark and burnt leaves coming down here, so we knew the fire was throwing debris ahead of itself. A lot of our response plan hinged on what happened in Boulder Creek; if we kept it west of the mountain, that was our best option. We kept communicating with CalFire, even before the unified command came into play. The fires that merged together along the top of the ridge created a large fire by most measures—5,000 acres—but especially for Santa Cruz County. PB: How close did the fire get to downtown Ben Lomond? CA: The fire burned in fingers along the drainages. A lot of people drive down Highway 9, look up at Bonny Doon, and they imagine one slope that runs up the mountain, but there are intermediate ridges and valleys all along that area. When I flew the fire the following week, you could see where the fire had moved through various drainages along the mountain, and fed downward. That’s how the fire moved into our district—in pieces and parts. Thursday morning at 2am we had a spot fire on Upper Alba Road—about an acre—threatening two homes in heavy timber. We thought we had a handle on it, but then it came across Alba drainage and took several homes with it. We had already done prep work around the homes, so we tried to manage it, but it came out of the Clear Creek drainage further down and crossed over and took the Alba Schoolhouse. When it emerged, it was almost a crown fire at that point. We had three different types of fire: during the day it was creeping, staying in the duff (the layer of decomposing organic materials lying below the litter layer of freshly fallen twigs, needles, and leaves and immediately above the mineral soil), which was a few feet thick in some places, with 1-2 foot flame lengths. At night, the same fuels were burning but the fire was moving up the trees, and we’d see 12-15 foot flame lengths where the fire was moving up the trees and torching them, and if enough trees were close together, we would get a crown fire which can run faster than we could move. It was strange fire behavior, and always more intense at night. The first five nights the marine layer held the smoke in, creating terrible visibility. People would ask me why helicopters weren’t coming in with water drops, since they have night vision. They do have night vision, but they need to maneuver the bucket over the trees to make a drop, and they just couldn’t see the tree canopy to make an effective run at it, so they stopped flying after 7:30pm. About a week into the fire, we started getting helicopters, and that really helped. Next week: Lessons learned in the CZU August Lightning Complex Fire 

Last week: The fire threatens the top of town, but Boulder Creek crews are able to hold it at bay, even while their own houses burn.

This past week I chatted with a very busy and well informed man, Robert Gray, the Felton Fire Protection District Chief.  While we covered much, Gray’s most important sentiment was advice for our community in the coming months, “Be patient out there.  There’s a lot of people hurting who have lost their homes. The community needs to be kind to each other right now.  That goes a long way for people in the recovery process…. Everyone is hurting in their own way, those that lost their homes, firefighters, those who had to evacuate. The fire fighters aren’t just shrugging off the 1,000 lost homes.  Every home you lose as a fire fighter hurts.  Some fire fighters in pain of losing homes in our community, and their own home.  Even those who haven’t lost their homes, but evacuated, are processing a lot of trauma.  Let’s use patience and kindness in our interactions, because we simply don’t know what someone could be going through.”

Summary of last week’s article: the CZU August Complex Lighting Fire approaches Boulder Creek, and Boulder Creek Fire Protection District Chief Mark Bingham calls for an evacuation order, protecting thousands of lives.  We continue the story in Boulder Creek Fire Chief Mark Bingham’s words: “As everyone in the Valley has learned by now, there are evacuation zones that are mapped out, and residents can find their location on those maps. When I figured out we needed an immediate evacuation, I selected the routes based on the impending danger, population and road access. We evacuated some people along Hwy 236 down, towards the east, and then south on Highway 9; the other Hwy 236 residents were evacuated towards the coast, residents who live on Highway 9 north of Bear Creek Road, we sent out towards Santa Clara; residents on Bear Creek Road were diverted out towards Highway 17, and the last group, which includes the business district and residents down to Brookdale, were sent south on Highway 9 towards Santa Cruz. By sending everyone in different directions, and evacuating residents from top to bottom—all on the same night—we kept residents moving safely without plugging up routes. The maps are already built and the zones are already there, but the implementation is up to each District Chief based on conditions and hazards. I determined the routes and the timing, working with law enforcement to implement that plan based on the predicted fire behavior. I remember being outside the station and seeing our flag blowing towards the east, and I just knew that fire was headed right for us. The 236 corridor was especially dangerous—between the wind and the terrain, that fire was going to get pushed right down the mountain. “By Tuesday night, I started calling all fire personnel to come into the station. I told them we were going to be impacted by a fire, and I didn’t know when it was going to hit the district, nor how big it was going to be, but I had made the decision to evacuate all residents. We have an internal system that we use for notification of personnel; both the Netcom dispatch center and the Felton Command Center were made aware of our evacuation order. Immediately, my phone started ringing off the hook. There’s a rotating zone coordinator for Santa Cruz County that is notified when there’s a big incident, and that person is responsible for contacting dispatchers to advise movement of personnel in the county to make sure that all areas are still covered. Our local government did an amazing job of getting ready, working with the zone coordinator and calling in the operations area coordinator (which happens to be the local Unit Chief with CalFire). The operations area coordinator then deferred his position to his backup, which was the Scotts Valley Fire Chief—that was a great decision because then they could split responsibilities between managing CalFire assets and overseeing local governance of the incident. “I made sure that all of our volunteers that were evacuating the town were on notice, and they received notification at the same time all the residents did, which was via reverse 9-1-1 calls. At that point, the danger was imminent—it was just a straight evacuation order, and that included the families of our personnel. There were no favors given to anyone. Our volunteers helped remove their families from the area, and then returned to the station, ready to engage. I gave a brief plan of action, and an estimated timeline of when I thought the incident might impact the district, and then got in touch with CalFire in Felton to determine our next move. While I was meeting with our volunteers, the operations area coordinator was contacting other local jurisdictions like Watsonville, Aptos and Santa Cruz to let them know of the impending need for support in our valley—“it’s all built in”-county mutual aid through local government. “I also placed a call to a friend, who’s a local retired Boulder Creek firefighter [NOTE: he chose to remain anonymous for this story], and I asked him to come to the station and be my scribe. I needed someone to take notes and document all the things I was saying and doing during the course of this incident, and he agreed to assist me. I was relieved that he was there to write down what had already happened, what was happening next, and every move I made along the way. I knew it all needed to be recorded, and he’s been with me since the 17th of August, capturing everything. We went down to the CalFire Command Center together to find out what resources we had on the way, what was known about the fire, hoping to hear that help was on the way. What I found out was they were already stretched thin and had very limited resources available. They have responsibility over all of Santa Cruz County, and they were spread into San Mateo County for this fire, which is also within their jurisdiction. At this point, there were fires in Santa Clara County as well, and everyone was calling for resources and support. CalFire had sent some help into our area, and I was glad for that, but it was not the level of assistance we required. 7,500 acres is a big fire for Santa Cruz County—the wind direction combined with a six-mile spot was confirmation that it was going to impact us, and I needed more. “I inquired about air support and was told that none was available that evening, and they weren’t sure if any would be available the next day (Tuesday, August 18). I left them to figure out their plan, and returned to Boulder Creek; my friend and I headed to the top of the ridge to try and scout it out ourselves and determine how close it was, and before we even got to the edge of our district on the eastern side, you could see the glow on the mountain along Upper China Grade Road, and see the direction the smoke was headed—straight down 236. The embers were coming right down that gully, and from there it was off to the races; we spread out everywhere we could to try and put out spot fires and control the spread. There were sheriff’s officers who were stationed along our roads and were calling all clear for residences, so we started pinning private road gates and logging gates open for access; that helped with what happened next, which was we started to get local government help from other Santa Cruz County agencies to assist with structure protection. “It was all a blur after that—the fire came over the mountain and overran us several times. We would get into one neighborhood, and save ten homes but lose two, and then in another neighborhood we’d lose six and save one. We started to pull back down to town to regroup; we were becoming exhausted and we needed to resupply our engines with water. We basically fought it all the way down the 236 drainage and down West Park, and the ridge coming off of Braemoor Drive down to the back of town. We pulled back to town and had an impromptu operational briefing where I gave instructions as to what we would do if we had to hold the town. Part of our plan to hold the town was to leave some resources along Central Avenue, and run patrol along the Highway 9 corridor in town, including a few blocks in each direction and lower 236. We would engage engines up towards the fire from there, and do what we could to fend it off. As the fire front was coming, it was moving in different directions and blowing in very fast; it would move through one neighborhood, and we’d have to remove ourselves due to heat and the extreme nature of it, and then we’d dive right back in after it had passed through. We were putting out fires behind houses and on houses and then chasing it to the next home where we’d battle it again, and we were just…I don’t know how many hours straight we went. We would fight fire all day, and then every evening it would come back in hard, and push down the mountain, just like clockwork. All day it would blow West toward town and between 6pm and 8pm, the wind would carry it southwest down the 236 drainage area, and we’d watch the sparks and embers blow off and start a spot fire. And then another spot fire. And another one. And then it would continue to travel down the ridge towards town. That happened four nights in a row where it would threaten, threaten, threaten, and then it would die down at the last minute. It was crazy. The only thing that gave me the calm and clarity to create a plan and work the fire was that we were going to hold town, no matter what. We had a Plan A, and a contingency plan, and an emergency plan. It was a fight. “It got within a block of town up West Park. It was just a block behind Scopazzi’s and it burned down to the church on Highway 9, including the town graveyard. It burned south for a while along 9, and then went back up the mountain. As the days went on, we started to get more resources from CalFire and out-of-area strike teams, but it was a few days into the incident. I was able to find a trail that connected behind Paone Drive, and all the way around the cemetery behind the elementary school, and got tied in with two hand crews from CalFire. We formed the plan and assisted them in a firing operation and held the school with a couple of engines as it was just ripping behind the school.  In firing operations, crews progress so as to maintain a safety zone close at hand allowing the fuels inside the control line to be consumed before going ahead. (Wikipedia)  “It was one of those cliché moment where we said, “Come hell or high water, we’re holding town and we’re holding our school.” We tried to hold the water treatment plant, but we couldn’t—the fire ran us out of there. We had two engines up there trying to hold infrastructure because we know that power and water are what keep people here. If you don’t have a town, people aren’t going to rebuild; if you lose homes, that’s terrible, but if you lose your whole town, people are pretty unlikely to build back, and if you lose your school, it’s hard to get folks to come back and start over. While all of this was going on, we still had crews out in neighborhoods, knocking down flames on houses and holding lines. It was a matter of how many resources we could send out, and how many we needed to hold back. We were on West Park, fighting the fire and trying to slow its progression—it was right above the library. We were getting closed off on the south end, because it was coming out onto 9, and we were prepared to ride it out in the center of town, while it burned over us. None of our volunteers once said they needed to go back to check on their own homes. Not once. We all knew that we were going to do what we could to save town, and not worry about ours. We were prepared for the fight.” Next week, the final installment: Town is spared, but the battle continues as losses mount. 

The signs draped on highway overpasses really do say it all:  “Thank you Firefighters”  “Thank you Cal Fire, Sheriff, Police, EMS.” The profound thanks and gratitude is from the heart and the feelings of appreciation are authentic and run deep.  I believe this outpouring reflects a realization that our homes and way of life in our city really did hang in the balance and our fortuitous escape from disaster made people reflect on their good fortune.

Beginning August 29th, resources were made available for fire evacuees at the Kaiser Permanente Arena at 140 Front Street.  From 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. every day, community members can receive a meal and help from many organizations, including the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA), American Red Cross, and CAL FIRE.  According to Fifth District Supervisor, Bruce McPherson, almost 4,000 individuals have already been helped. Shannon Stabler, the Public & Community Relations Coordinator for the Arena, reports that the Recovery Resource Center will remain open “for at least 30 days, when we will reevaluate and see if the Center is still needed. So far, it’s been a great success, with such an outpour of support from so many organizations.”